Appendix B (online): Assessing the validity of self-reported legislative resource provision

In the main paper we measure legislative resource priorities using data from the PELA survey, but since the relevant survey item is unconstrained there is a real danger that the answers are not substantively meaningful. This appendix analyzes this possibility in three ways. First, we analyze whether there is systematic variation in the priority legislators assign to different representative behaviors (in addition to district resource provision) using the following survey item (asked in survey wave II and III only):[1]

> *"Thinking about the work you do as Deputy, how much importance do you place on the following aspects of your legislative work?"*
>
> *4 A lot*
> *3 Some*
> *2 A little*
> *1 None*
>
> *[Representing the nation]*
> *[Making laws]*
> *[Solving the problems of <country name>]*
> *[Monitoring the behavior of the Government]*
> *[Defending the interests of your party]*
> *[Producing the national budget]*
> *[Representing the interests of your district]*

The results shown in Figure 1 illustrate that legislators systematically assign different levels of priority to different types of representation. For example, they assign more priority to representing the district in general, and to making laws, than they do to providing resources for the district. They also assign even less priority to other behaviors such as defending party interests and producing the national budget.

Second, we show that there is meaningful variation in these data at the district level. Specifically, we make the survey-district the unit of analysis and show the district distribution of average priorities assigned to each of the representative behaviors from the survey item above (Figure 2b). In order to assure that these results are reliable (while not excluding too many districts), we only include districts that had at least 10 respondents (and thus a district magnitude of at least 10). The district averages are reasonably normally distributed and have a variance that resembles that of a standard normal. Specifically, the standard deviations for the eight behavioral dimensions range from .62 to .99.

[1] The district resource provision question was asked separately (as described in the main paper), but with the same response categories.

Finally, we show that this district level variation in legislative priorities is only systematically related to district population density when we have a clear theoretical expectation that it should be. Specifically, we use the model specification from the main paper (Table 4 in the main paper) and apply it to the variables from Figure 1b and Figure 2b. The results show that legislators in more population dense districts are significantly less likely to prioritize their district voters in general (who we argue have a higher level of demand), and the provision of district resources in particular, but population density is unrelated to all the other types of representative behaviors that legislators were asked about in the survey. Collectively the results presented in this appendix thus indicate that the responses to the PELA survey are substantively meaningful and that their relationship with district population density is as well.

Figure 1b: Average priority assigned to various representative behaviors



Note: The figure shows the average priority legislators assign to various representative behaviors with 95 percent confidence intervals

Figure 2b: The district distribution of legislative priorities



Note: The figure shows the distribution of district averages for the different priority variables.
The dashed vertical lines represent the means of these distributions.
Only districts with at least 10 respondents are included.

Table 1b: District population density and legislative priorities

Variable	Model 4.1 District resources	Model 1.1b District resources†	Model 1.2b Representing nation	Model 1.3b Making laws	Model 1.4b Country problems
District population density	-0.077***	-0.157***	-0.008	-0.006	-0.001
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.036)
District magnitude	-0.232***	-0.284***	0.071	0.133*	0.056
	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Government party	0.177***	0.086	-0.233**	-0.067	-0.248**
	(0.049)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.108)
Cut point 1	-2.923	-3.394	-2.183	-3.292	-1.534
	(0.186)	(0.265)	(0.258)	(0.409)	(0.229)
Cut point 2	-2.090	-2.281	-1.117	-1.530	-0.200
	(0.181)	(0.247)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.221)
Cut point 3	-1.184	-1.660	-0.326	-0.276	-
	(0.179)	(0.241)	(0.227)	(0.223)	
Random intercept variance:	0.053	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001
Districts	(0.017)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
N	3,106	695	700	705	702

Variable	Model 1.5b Monitoring government	Model 1.6b Defending party interests	Model 1.7b National budget	Model 1.8b General district interests
District population density	-0.022	-0.035	-0.030	-0.176***
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.051)
District magnitude	0.042	-0.043	0.048	-0.204*
	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.111)
Government party	-0.368***	-0.073	-0.006	-0.081
	(0.101)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.119)
Cut point 1	-2.757	-2.523	-1.948	-3.714
	(0.275)	(0.233)	(0.219)	(0.338)
Cut point 2	-1.520	-1.316	-0.945	-2.411
	(0.245)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.290)
Cut point 3	-0.439	-0.219	-0.158	-1.328
	(0.237)	(0.206)	(0.208)	(0.281)
Random intercept variance:	0.028	<.001	<.001	0.106
Districts	(0.032)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.065)
N	703	701	697	704

***p<.01, **p<.05, *<0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients are from ordered probit models.
† Sample restricted to include only legislators who were given the other priority questions.
The unit of analysis in all models is the PELA survey wave-legislator.
Dummy variables for country-waves are included, but not shown.